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Telephone (801) 295-9003

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
KATHERINE A. THRASH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

)
)
)

vs.

)

JAMES L. THRASH,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PETITION FOR RE-HEARING

)

Defendant/Respondent,
STATE OF UTAH, Office of
Recovery Services,
Intervenor.

Case No. 970204-CA
Before Judges Wilkins,
Jackson, and Orme
WILKINS, Associate
Presiding Judge

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON RE-HEARING
TRIAL COURT has denied Appellant's State and Federal
constitutional right to equal protection.
ISSUE #1.

Newly discovered evidence shows that the Utah

Office of Recovery Services has an administrative policy that
outlines the conduct of paternity interviews with welfare mothers
who have born a child during a period of separation from their
husbands.
As a condition of continued Aid for Dependent Children,
the mothers who have born a child by a male other than their
husbands are required to identify the out-of-wedlock child's
biological father.

The Utah Attorney General implements the affidavit
bastardizing a child born to a welfare mother by first
administering DNA tests to the husband/legal father, the afterborn child, and the mother.
When the husband has been excluded as the biological
father of the child bastardized by the mother's affidavit, the
Attorney General's office next files a paternity action against
the mother and the biological father identified in her paternity
interview affidavit.

A court order is obtained for additional

DNA tests on the biological father, the mother, and the child;
and an order for support is entered based on the 99% or more
probability that the biological father is the legal father.
There are some TWENTY (20) Assistant Attorneys General
doing paternity cases in the various district courts of this
State.

It is estimated that each Assistant Attorney General does

at least TWO (2) cases per calendar year where a husband is first
excluded and then a biological father identified by DNA testing
for an estimated total of FORTY (40) or more cases per year in
the district courts of Utah.

The denial of the Appellant's right

to equal protection does not rest on an isolated incident as the
Court of Appeals must have supposed when the opinion failed to
address Appellant's right to raise the " re levant fact11 of
paternity by affidavit in the court below.
and Appellant's Brief at Tab No. 1.)

(See Exhibit "A" here

(ORS case #0000221598 also

Second District Paternity Action Civil #974700047PA.)
ORS Administrative Policy #168, Exhibit "B" herein.)
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(See also
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* he C o u r t * -

m.-r^ t e s t i m o n y

t

rule
I

forbidding

both

I! | . a t r

child and forbidding tne Lower Luurt s , troognition ot her
affidavit raising- the 'relevant u» *

i uaternity*1 m

tn r

to amend her V n if led Complaint defeats ucr

i.*i

,^>,tion

78-25-18 to raise the relevant fact, and should be revere
ARGUMENT
The broad

*nguage

if x he statute does ...

rrquir

i

;iit"-

traditiona

n sense eiUier by aiurnumcui *

amendment t<, i * answer

in

tats

iiiO complaint,

ir m y , by affidavit of rithei party, or
* .r.atter.

it ir, an .nauthor izea limitation *>i ,ae Appellant s
statutory r i irt

i hat.

iii ait* '

oiiow an> particular

J; ..

"

the only *>
opinion

,:JI\«

method as set w%-

ifrrita^e be

>*. ..w^. ;, .,* Appeal s

he case at bar, and the case must be thoughtfully

to allege that m y ,
UL

I

;sues were not adequately briefed than
l,

.serv^ •»-'.* 'Ho -nnfli^^ between the

necessity of a petition for reconsideration.

It requires the good will and cooperation of all persons and
agencies dealing with the sacred but unwritten constitutional
rights of parents relating to their children which is imposed by
the United States Supreme Court case of Santosky v« Kramer» 455
U.S. 745 (1982) (USSC+) 1987 cited with approval 1998.)
A paternity interview by the Office of Recovery Services
caseworker always gives rise to a sworn statement bastardizing
the child either from the mother or the father.

From 40 to 100

or more such sworn statements are routinely accepted yearly by
the district courts.
There is no definition or explanation of how, in the case at
bar, the Trial Court could refuse the sworn testimony of
Appellant at default hearing and accept the same testimony in the
form of a verified amended complaint before the default hearing.
ISSUE #3.

The issue of the deliberate falsification of the

Trial Court record by someone in the office of the Trial Judge by
removing Appellant's Findings and Decree which conformed to the
evidence at trial was not addressed by the opinion.
So far as counsel knows, there is no case law precedent
for the loss of documents sent to the Trial Judge's chambers but
never returned to the file.
ISSUE #4.

(See Docket, Exhibit " C " )

Regardless of when or how or by whom the

"relevant factM of paternity is raised, the DNA test is a
mandatory obligation of the Trial Court.
a

In any civil action or in bastardy
proceedings in which the parentage of a
person is a relevant fact, the court shall
order the child and the alleged parents to
4
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mother's testimony, the mother's affidavit, and the father's
uncontroverted but unsworn statement, *She has told you I am not
the father,' are held not to bastardize the child, but merely to
raise the "relevant fact* of paternity in a form that then
mandates blood or DNA testing.
Issue #5.

Evidence newly discovered since oral argument,

and only made available to Appellant's counsel on May 3. 1998.
illustrates that the Busch v. Busch stipulation cited in
Appellant's Brief at Tab No. 1, and Exhibit

A" here, as the

basis for establishing that Appellant has been denied equal
protection of the law thereby violating her State and Federal
constitutional rights is not the isolated incident which must
have been supposed by the Court of Appeals when it failed to
address the argument as briefed.

The following analysis clearly

illustrates that only the Appellant herein has been denied the
right to raise the "relevant fact* of her child's parentage since
at least the year 1987 to date.
ARGUMENT
ANALYSIS OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT THEREUPON
ORS Administrative Rule, "Establishment of Paternity/1 CS
168 Legal Father 4/87, Revised 9/97.
1.

General.
What remains of Lord Mansfield's Rule is recognized

even though the mother states her husband is not the child's
natural father.
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2.

Judicial Order Excludes Legal Father.
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I u be assured of her rights of

procedural due process, the only thing the Court had an option to

do under the statutes controlling "relevant facts'* on the
parentage of any child was either to sign Appellant's Findings
and Decree which had been taken into his chambers by his clerk,
or to order DNA tests as provided by law and then sign the
Appellant's Findings and Decree.
Counsel for Appellant knows of no standard by which the
disappearance of documents listed in the docket record by the
clerk from the Court's official file can be briefed, but it
cannot be reasonably disputed that the Lower Court's actions,
after losing the Appellant's Findings and Decree, could not be
justified then and cannot be justified now.

Because of the Lower

Court's actions, the Appellant's most sacred constitutional
rights as to the parentage of her child have been breached.
3.

Judicial Order Silent.
"However, if all parties agree that the legal father is

not, in fact, the father, consult the attorney (Utah Attorney
General Deputy) about having the parties stipulate to a judicial
paternity and child support against the natural father.11
ARGUMENT
In the case at bar, a similarly situated natural mother,
RAQUEL BUSCH, was afforded this means of "raising a relevant
fact" as provided by 78-25-18 UCA 1953 as amended 1955.

The

Trial Court violated Appellant's right to equal protection of
both the statute and the Statewide administrative procedure under
ORS Policy #168 when it failed to recognize that the silence of
8

Defendant
den

.iL t h e d e f a u l t

f i l l

order

I

ii

f o r UNA l a s t i n g

concealed
husband
ruling

h e a r i n g : at; w II
i 1 i

a t m i n i num.

from c o u n s e l

Hi-il

I In

hearing

sought

in t h e complaint1*

Appt I I

!

I mi „ I

fact*1
the

Ii

a s l o lie 1 c h i l d ' s

fact

appea

that

Appellant

\ \

controlling
I HI I

Law D i c t i o n a r y ,
4.
T i »ii (

1 1

Ihird

No J u d i c i a l
1

Order,

the natural

a t page
1 * 11 1 l y s i s

II

I Ike m o t h e i • M - d o e s

father

iguoiiil

tu plead or t o
(

of a p a r t y g i v e s
videtur."

II
I hi;
tliil

(Balientine * s

lull, J
of ORS A d m i n i s t r a t i v e

but the natural father
serve 111

agency act 1

I1

suppi ;

re levant

I kewise

hin consent

no L i1 Ijeve

establishing paternity,

action

lf

h e was n o t t h e l a t h e r

onsentirr

hdition,

sterile

Rule

1

9

himself

I h u Lour I

L a t i n maximum i s , ' ' S i l e n c e
I

deliberately

t o make a

I I le p r i m a r y

h,\ri i1 i \ e n

I

| irhcial

ignoring that t h e

by h i s f a i l u r e

that

*o

wmiltl n< ed ,;omeriay b y

I

III

11 1 nil "

intent

while

patermlj.

^ id».>ing t h e f a c t

i onsent

t h e Luui L wuulii 4,141 I I I

I 4I

t h e Respondent,

I I I

hi

thihl

that

"relief

I

I h e Low* i I ' o u r t

mil i p p e l l a n t

nil » llu I i l h n
a t t h e iJ l a u l t

i

is hit; u n c o n t r o v e r t e d

II II

by***refer

t h e case

I I appropriate,

I
I

4I

II

will

I father

1 I Ii 1

to the attorney

II

not cooperate

I e '+**nnt
lu join

,f

j

in

w i t h n o t i c e of

t h e a t t o r n e y may e s t a b l i s h

,; . 1 in ins 1 .,

II I I I

I I

the iegai
a temporary

ARGUMENT
The Utah Attorney General has intervened in the case at bar
at the Lower Court level.

No support order was ever entered

against the sterile legal father.

At the Spouse Abuse Protective

Order hearing, the Respondent denied paternity and proclaimed his
sterility in an unsworn statement off the record.

Appellant

admitted to her counsel that her Verified Complaint was false on
the 'relevant fact" of paternity; whereupon, counsel notified the
Court that no support order should be entered, and that paternity
would be an issue in the divorce.

Such notice meets the

requirement of 78-25-18 UCA 1953 as amended 1995.
The Attorney General has not followed ORS Administrative
Rule #168 even though intervention has been requested and ordered
in that no support has ever been sought against either the
husband legal father or the biological father from the time the
Complaint was filed on June 10, 1996, until 18 months later when
the Respondent's Findings and Decree were signed by the Court on
January 28, 1998.
The Utah Attorney General, by silence on the issue of
paternity, has assisted Respondent in denying xippellant's right
to the protection of statutory law and administrative due process
of law by its failure to pursue the legal father, respondent, and
the natural father identified by the Appellant both by testimony
and by affidavit of Appellant as required by the non-judicial
order provisions of CS 168 ORS Administrative Regulations, Book
II.

(See Exhibit

B. )
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The fact that in Busch v. Busch a similarly situated welfare
mother was assisted by the Utah Attorney General to raise a
"relevant fact" by an affidavit (Exhibit "D") on a paternity
action is not an isolated incident as may have been thought by
this Court in its April 23, 1998, Ruling which failed entirely to
address the equal protection argument as briefed.

Busch was also

permitted to stipulate in a civil action that the child was not
the issue of the legal father.

(Exhibit "A.")

All tax supported lawyers have a duty to all citizens as
well as to their respective agencies to do justice.

The failure

of Family Support Division, Utah Attorney General's Office, to
file a brief disclosing a policy that has existed since 1987 but
was not applied by them to benefit a natural mother who seeks to
raise the * relevant fact1* of paternity is both forbidden by the
1987 United States Supreme Court case of Santosky v. Kramer on
the issue of the public duty of official government agencies and
a default in the duty of the Utah Attorney General to protect the
Appellant's constitutional rights to equal protection and due
process of law under Federal and State constitutions.
CONCLUSIONS
Only by recognizing that this Court misunderstood the record
when it alleged that Appellant had not raised the statutory
* re levant fact of parentage'1 by amending her complaint instead of
attempting to bastardized her child by her testimony or affidavit
can the Appellant's all important family rights be protected and
what remains of Lord Mansfield's Rule preserved.
11

The case must

be remanded to the Lower Court for DNA testing of the legal and
the biological fathers.

(See ORS Policy 168, Exhibit

B. )

In 1998, the delivery of sufficient viable sperm to
fertilize a live ovum no longer requires penal penetration or
access.

The female's ovum is today impregnated in a petri dish,

and need not be re-implanted in the donor female to produce a
live offspring.

Previously impregnated ovum can be returned to

the natural mother long after the death of the legal and
biological father.

The question of which this Court should take

judicial notice is that the resulting child has been determined
to be entitled to social security survivor's benefits, according
to national news accounts.

This is access from another world.

Sterility must be treated as being the physical equivalent
of being in another country under ORS Administrative Rule 168,
(see Exhibit "B"), and is physiologically the equivalent of nonaccess under what remains of Lord Mansfield's Rule.

Appellant

urges a stipulation of the State, the Appellant, and Respondent
requiring that the matter be remanded to the Lower Court to
determine access by DNA testing during the six-hour period
critical to conception, and that paternity abide the result.
Unless the 28 salaried law clerks of the Court of Appeals
and the 20 additional Assistant Attorneys General who prosecute
cases like the one at bar in the State district courts can become
imbued with the natural law mandate to do justice based on the
relevant facts in family law cases such as this one, the United
States Supreme Court must inevitably arrive at the conclusion
12

that the State of Utah is not capable of following its mandate in
Santosky v. Kramer.

(Supra).

The High Court then can be

expected to require not only that the states pay for transcripts
in indigent cases such as was recently done in South Carolina,
but that the State must also provide indigent families a number
of law-trained personnel equal to the number employed by the
State so as to assure that cases involving these sacred issues of
family will not be disposed of because they are Hnot adequately
briefed.11

On remand, the Lower Court should be required to order

the production of non-testimonial DNA evidence by the parents and
child as mandated in the applicable statute.

Paternity should

follow the outcome of DNA testing.
I certify that this petition is not filed for purposes of
delay.
Dated this 6th day of May, 1998.

VAL ROBERTS
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing PETITION FOR RE-HEARING, postage prepaid, on the 7th
day of May. 1998, to the following:

Jon J. Bunderson, Attorney,

Bunderson & Baron, 45 North First East, Brigh&m City, Utah 84302.

ROBERT
Attorney at Law
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Exhibit A

ExhM "A"
9*'10 53^*97
DIUMENTI & LEWIS
George S. Diumenti II #0888
Attorney for Pliintiff
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: 292-0447

ci.E~.ir. z ;.:• sv*. C C J R T

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RAQUEL BUSCH,
Plaintiff,

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT

vs.
STEVEN BUSCH,

Case No. 944700971

Defendant,
STATE OF UTAH, Department of
Human Services,
Intervener.

Come now the plaintiff and defendant above named and hereby
stipulate and agree, subject to the approval of the Court, as
follows:
1.

That

the

parties

have

experienced

irreconcilable

differences during the course- of their marriage, and each should be
granted a divorce from the other.
2.

That there have been 3 children born issue of this

marriage to wit:

*

Ian Busch, born March 17, 1986; jfLSpejtUH t~
Sean Busch, born July 28, 1988; tkrj^zpc^f-"
Stevie Busch, born December 9, 1989

.^L

3.

That plaintiff is a fit and proper parent and should be

awarded the sole care, custody and control of the parties' minor
children, with reasonable and generous visitation reserved in the
defendant as prescribed by the Minimum Visitation Guidelines, a
copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein.
4.

That the defendant. ^£ould pay child support to the

plaintiff in the amount of $iG6i92 per month in accordance with the
Uniform Child Support Schedule, based upon plaintiffs income at
$730.00 per month and the defendant's income at $619.00 per month.
5. v^Rat in the event that the defendant is current
— * ^ ^ ^ ^

„..

•

nn-J^TfQ

"~

^

c h i l d fnippnrt nhTihgSTTmv n?_gjia f I fifty* t h e r i g h t t o c l a i m ^ h ^ m i n o r j ^ / ?

72*

fildren as dependents for income tax^Jtn^pas^&^^fb^
6.

\hyfffity

That both parties maintain medical, dental and optical

insurance for the benefit of the minor children if it is available
through their employer at a reasonable cost.
7.

That defendant shall pay one-half of work related child

care expenses subject to plaintiffs proof of such claims, e.g.,
receipts, bills, etc,
8.

That both parties shall pay one-half of non-covered

medical, dental and optical expenses.
8.

That both parties waive any and all rights to alimony.

9.

That defendant

shall relinquish any and all claims

attendant the real property and mobile home located at 1296
Governor

Circle, Woods

Cross, Utah,

subject

to

plaintiffs

assumption of all obligations attendant the r^al property and
mobile home, including but not limited to all costs attendant

maintenance, mortgage payments, taxes and insurance thereon.
10.

That the debts incurred during the course of the^ parties1

marriage be divided equally between them, and thfe parties shall
each be responsible for all debts incurred since their separation,
holding the oth^r harmless thereon,
11•

That each party shall be responsible for their own costs

and attorney's fees attendant this divorce action, and hold the
other blameless thereon.

Dated this $ $ .

day of

NOTARY PUBLIC
J.VAL ROBERTS
499 North Main
CtmervHte.UT 84014
My CommitSKX) Exptrts
January i?nd. 1999
STATE OF UTA.H

STATE OF UT
COUNTY OF

A<$rS.1-

1996.

Kajljque JBusch
Kajtfquej.
Plainti

£_>ss.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this Q-Q

(\ts%&r

, 1996.

:y Public
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

day of

91

7*

Dated this

/

day of

Steven §nstfr
Defendant
STATE OF UTAH
, )
2Sbili
COUNTY OF _
/ )/*V i \ )ss
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Approved as to form:

Richard A. Hummel
Assistant Attorney General
Intervenor

J, Val Roberts
Attorney for Plaintiff
Davis County Title XX Legal Aid

^

Exhibit B

31Z-K3U

Exh-ht -B"
CS 168
ESTABLISHMENT OF PATERNITY
CS 168 Legal Father 4/87 Revised 9/97
GENERAL
If the child was conceived or born during the obligee's marriage, the legal father (bv
marriage) is responsible for child support and medical expenses until a court order or other
legal document, such as a voluntary declaration of paternity, indicates otherwise, even though
the obligee states that the husband is not the child's natural father
JUDICIAL ORDER EXCLUDES LEGAL FATHER
if the divorce decree or findings of facts* has a paragraph such as "During the marriage, a
child was born to Mrs. Doe. Mr. Doc is not the father of the child because he was residing in
another country at the time of conception;" or "during the marriage, a child was bom to Mrs.
Doe. Mr Doe is not the father of that child'" or "There were no children born as issue of the
marriage and none are expected;" you may generally presume that the legal father has been
judicially excluded as the father of the child" Proceed to establish paternity against the
alleged father. Consult with your attorney if you are unsure if the judicial order excludes the
legal father.
JUDICIAL ORDER STLFNT
If the divorce decree is silent regarding the child in Question, the legal father has not been
excluded. However, if all parties agree that the legal father is in fact not the father, consult
with your attorney about the possibility of having the parties stipulate to a judicial paternity
and child support order against the natural father.
If all parties do not agree, refer the case to the attorney to modify the existing support order
to include a support amount against the legal father for the child in question. Do not proceed
administratively against the legal father. If paternity of the child becomes an issue in the
court proceedings, the court may order genetic tests that may result in an exclusion on the
legal father Should this occur, proceed to establish paternity against the alleged father.
NO JUDICIAL ORDER
If there is no court order between the obligee and the obligor, such as in a separation case,
any child born during the marnage is legally the obligor's responsibility, even though the
obligee may name another man as the natural father of the child. However, if the mother, the
natural father, and the legal father all agree, have them sign the voluntary declaration form.
The child must have been bom in Utah Refer to CS 159, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity
by Parents section of policy. In signing the declaration, the legal father consents to the
natural fathers voluntary declaration of paternity. After the declaration form is signed,
proceed to establish an administrative support obligation against the obligor.
If the legal father cannot be located and the mother and natural father are willing to sign a
judicial voluntary acknowledgment forms, you may be able to obtain a judicial order
establishing paternity on the natural father Consult with your attorney if you have such a
case.
If the mother believes the legal father is the natural father, or the mother does not believe the
1

CS 168
legal father i& ihe natural father but the natural father will not cooperate in establishing
paternity, serve the obligor (legal father) with an administrative Notice of Agency Action If
the obligor raises the issue of paternity after he has been served, inform the obligor that he
must exclude himself by court order, such as a divorce order. If the obligor does not exclude
himself or has not filed a legal action in the district court, proceed to establish an
administrative order. Tf a legal action has been filed and is pending, such as a divorce action,
dismiss the administrative action and refer the case to your attorney to join in the action. If
appropriate, the attorney may establish a temporary support order against the legal father.
LEGAL FATHER RESPONSIBILITY
It is generally the responsibility of the legal father to begin the action to exclude himself The
legal father must retain his own legal counsel for this purpose, Refer the case to the
appropriate attorney once you receive notification that the legal father is beginning exclusion
etforts
You may help the legal father arrange for genetic tests if the case meets the following criteria*
1. the legal father agrees to go through the testing laboratory ORS contracts with:"
2 the mother has named an alleged father; and?
3 the alleged tather has been located.
The legal father should pay for the tests for all parties involved in the exclusion process in
advance. Create and post the funds to the genetic test debt.
If the obligee has named the legal father as the natural father, do not initiate non-cooperation
proceedings against the obhgee if she does not cooperate with the legal father's efforts to
exclude himself. You may initiate non-cooperation proceedings against the obligee if she has
named another man as the natural father but will not cooperate with the genetic tests,
If the legal father is excluded, do not add the excluded father's testing costs to the biological
father's testing costs,
If the legal father made child support payments to ORS before he was excluded and now
wants ORS to refund the payments to him, consult with your manager and attorney. ORS
will usually only refund support payments in these cases if the original support order was by
default, and a court has ordered ORS to repay the money. Refer to CS 177, the Paternity Set
Aside section of policy for more information.
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2nd District - Farmington Dept
Case
: 964700883 DA Divorce/Annulment
Case Title:

Page 2
MARCH 19, 1997
3:16 PM
Filing Date: 06/10/96
Judge: MICHAEL G ALLPHIN
WEDNESDAY

THRASH, KATHERINE A VS THRASH, JAMES L

Party..: ATP
Name...:

Atty for Plaintiff
Work Phone.: (801) 295-9003

ROBERTS, J. VAL
P.O. BOX 666
CENTERVILLE

Party..: ATD
Name...:

Atty for Defendant

BUNDERSON, JOvT J.
45 NORTH 1ST EAST
BRIGHAM CITY

I
I

I

I
I
I
I

UT 840140000

UT 843020000

06/10/96 Case filed on 06/10/96 =*> Divorce/Annulment
CHILDREN
VERIFIED COMPLAINT ?OR DIVORCE
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET
NOTICE OF DIV.ED.CLASS REQ.
AFFIDAVIT OF IMP.
06/14/96 *D
*CONFIDENTIAL Lrf^TSR
06/19/96 *D
*SUMMONS/RETURN 6-18-96 ON JAMES
10/10/96 DEF
scheduled for 10/24/96 at 9:00 A in room 2 with MGA
VAL ROBERTS CALLED TO SCHEDULE DEFAULT, NOTICED IT SAID THERE'
ARE CHILDREN, HE SAID SHE IS GOING TO TESTIFY THAT THE CHILD IS
NOT DEFENDANTS
10/24/96 DEF
rescheduled to 10/31/96 at 9:00 A in room E with MGA
DEF RESCHEDULED AT COUNTER PER MR ROBERTS
11/05/96 962140004 Copy fee
5.00
COPIES
*D
*M.E. 10-31-96
.25
12/11/96 962380017 Copy fee
COPY
12/19/96 *********OBJECTION REC*********
*D
*OBJECTION TO PROPOSED FINDINGS AND DECREE
*D
*ENTRY OF APPEARANCE
*D
*MTN TO DENY SIGNING & ENTRY OF PLA'S
PROPOSED FINDINGS, DECREE & MNMO OR MTN
TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT
12/20/96 FF & DD
TO MGA
12/27/96 Accepted distribution TF $
8.00 from Misc. Payments screen

EXT
EXT
EXT
EXT
EXT
EXT
KHB
SAS
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
EXT
EXT
LAW
LAN
KF
LAW
LAW
LWW
LWW
KF
KF
KF
KF
DEL
LAW

D O C K E T
2nd District - Farmington Dept
Case
: 964700883 DA Divorce/Annulment
Case Title:

Page 3
MARCH 19, 1997
3:16 PM
Filing Date: 06/10/96
Judge: MICHAEL G ALLPHIN
WEDNESDAY

THRASH, KATHERINE A VS THRASH, JAMES L

01/08/97 *********OBJECTION REC'D**********
*D
*OBJECTIONS TO THF DEF'S SUFP MEMO AND NOT TO SUBMIT
FOR DECISION
'NOTICE TO SUBMIT/FILE TO RSP
I 01/09/97 *D
*RULING
I
*D
*NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION
I
*D
*SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
I 01/17/97 *D
*MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND TO SET
I
ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
I
*D
*REQUEST FOR HEARING AND FOR ORAL
I
ARGUMENT
I
*D
*PLAINTIFFS AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
I
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO
I
SFT ASIDE DEFAULT
I 01/29/97 *D
*AMENDED MAILING CERTIFICATE
01/31/97 NOTICE TO SUBMIT, FF AND DD RETURNED TO BUNDERSON FOR NON
COMPLIANCE
I
*D
*DIVORCES BY AFFIDAVIT CHECKLIST
02/04/97 ATTY BUNDERSON CALLED & STATED HE HAD RECEIVED HIS RESPONSE
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION BACK IN THE MAIL WITH A LETTER FOR
NON-COMPLIANCE.
I 02/05/97 *D
*REPLY TO THE DEFENDANTS OBJECTIONS TO
I
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
I
AND MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DEFENI>\NTS
I
COUNSEL FOR CONFLICT OF INTEREST
I 02/10/97 *D
*LETTER FROM VAI ROBERTS TO JON BUNDERSON
I
*D
*RESPONSE TO MTti FOR DISQUALIFICATION
02/28/97 Judge ID changed from RSP to MGA
Commissioner ID changed from DSD to
Case judgment is Default - Judge
Case disposition is Closed
•NOTICE TO SUBMIT
•LETTER FROM JON J. BUNDERSON, DATED 1-28-97
•RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
•FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
•DECREE OF DIVORCE
(4:22 PM)
JAMES IS TO PAY $200.00 LEGAL AID AND $82.00
COSTS
2-28-97 MGA
I
*D
*R±,QUEST TO SIGN FF & DD
I
*D
*RULING
03/05/97 OSC
scheduled for 3/27/97 at 3:30 P in room E with MGA
I 03/07/97 *D
*AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF OTSC
I
*D
*OTSC
End of the docket report for this case.

LMA
LMA
LMA
PAM
KF
KF
KF
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KF
LWW
LWW
KHB
KWE
KWE
KWE
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KF
KF
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
KHB
SAS
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IMC
KHB
KHB

DOCKET
2nd District - Farmington Dept

Pag* 1
MARCH 19, 1997
3:16 PM
Filing Date: 06/10/96
Judge: MICHAEL G ALLPHIN
WEDNESDAY

Case
: 964700883 DA Divorce/Annulment
Case Title:
THRASH, KATHERINE A VS THRASH, JAMES L

Cause of Action:
Amount of Suit.:
Return Date.•..:
Judgment
: DJ
Disposition....: CL

$.00
Default - Judge
Closed

Court Set: UNCONTESTED DIVORCE
ORDER 10 SHOW CAUSE

Date: 02/28/97
Date: 02/28/97

Amt:

$.00

on 10/31/96 at 0900 A in room E with MGA
on 03/27/97 at 0330 P in room E with MGA

No Tracking Activity.
No Accounts Payable Activity.
Transaction:
Civil File Fee
Civil File Fee
Civil File Fee
Misc Revenue

Party..: PLA
Name•••:

^ite:
06/10/96
11/05/96
12/11/96
12/;r/96

Plaintiff

THRASH, KATHERINE A

Party..: DEF
Name,,.*

Defendant

THRASH, JAMES L
»v

Cash-in Check-in Check-out
.00
.00
.00
5.00
.00
.00
.25
.00
*00
-00
8.00
.CO

Total
.00
5.00
.25
8.00
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AFFIDAVIT
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DAVIS

WTNE|^ANIU^ffSAltff4E

)
: ss.
)

I, Raquel Leigh Busch, being first duly sworn upon oath depose and say:
1. I am a resident of Davis County, State of Utah.
2. I am the mother of1 Kezzekiah
Kezzekian Talene
lalene Busch,
busch, born
born to
to me
1 out of wedlock on May 30, 1996.
3. Between the months of-»%r 1995 and ^September, 1995, I had sexual intercourse with David Scott
Simonsen and that intercourse took place in the State of Utah.
4. During the probable time of conception of Kezzekiah Talene Busch, I had sexual intercourse with no
male other than David Scott Simonsen.
5. Upon my best knowledge and understanding, I believe David Scott Simonsen to be the father of
Kezzekiah Talene Busch.
6. I have made application with the Department for child support services and/or I have received public
assistance (AFDC) from the State of Utah Department of Human Services and have assigned my child support rights
to the Department.
7. I understand that the Department intends to bring suit against David Scott Simonsen under the provisions
of U.C.A. §§ 78-45a-l, et seq., and that I will cooperate with the Department in the prosecution of said suit.

flaquel Leigh BuscrH*

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

/ $

da

x *tt\/?4fa4u?<t- »

1996.

NOTARY PUptfC
Residing at: Davis County, Utah
My Commission ExpiresT
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